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MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA:
AFFIRMATIVE REQUESTS AND
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COUNSEL
JACOB E. WARREN*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 2005, a jury in Louisiana state court found Jesse Jay
1
Montejo guilty of first-degree murder. The jury sentenced Montejo to
2
death the next day after three hours of deliberation. Montejo alleged
twenty assignments of error in his appeal to the Louisiana Supreme
Court,3 and the court addressed all but two of his assignments of error
4
in an unpublished appendix to its opinion.
The two other assignments of error, which the Louisiana Supreme
Court analyzed fully in the opinion rather than summarily in the
unpublished appendix, dealt with purported violations of Montejo’s
5
6
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. On January 16, 2008, the court
held that neither right had been violated,7 and then denied Montejo’s
8
petition for rehearing on March 7, 2008. Montejo filed a petition for
writ of certiorari on June 5, 2008.9

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1238–39 (La. 2008).
2. Id. at 1241.
3. Id. at 1250.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1251.
6. Id. at 1258. The court also reviewed Montejo’s death penalty sentence, as required by
Louisiana law, for any “passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors.” Id. at 1263.
7. Id. at 1258, 1262.
8. Id.
9. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W.
3358 (U.S. June 5, 2008) (No. 07-1529).
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The Supreme Court granted Montejo’s petition on October 1,
2008, and scheduled oral arguments for January 13, 2009,10 to address
Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but not his purported
11
Fifth Amendment violations. The question presented is: “When an
indigent defendant’s right to counsel has attached and counsel has
been appointed, must the defendant take additional affirmative steps
to ‘accept’ the appointment in order to secure the protections of the
Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation without
counsel present?”12
II. FACTS
On September 6, 2002, police brought Montejo in for
questioning.13 Montejo was a close friend and associate of Jerry
Moore—the man the police believed had planned the murder of
14
Lewis Ferrari the day before. The police interviewed Montejo from
4:30 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on September 6, and then from 3:00 a.m. to
4:00 a.m. on September 7.15 The videotapes from these two interviews
proved to be pivotal to the State’s case: they showed that “Montejo
slowly made increasingly incriminating statements until he finally
admitted that he shot the victim who had unexpectedly returned
16
home and interrupted Montejo’s burglary.” Altogether, by the
completion of second interview, Montejo had told police six different
versions of how the crime occurred—all of which were drastically
different.17
On the morning of September 10—four days after Ferrari’s
murder and three days after Montejo’s initial interrogation—Montejo
18
appeared in court for a mandatory initial hearing. At this hearing,
the judge appointed the Office of the Indigent Defenders to represent
Montejo.19 The record from this hearing does not indicate that
10. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. June 5, 2008), available at
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-1529.htm.
11. Id.
12. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. June 5, 2008), available at
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf.
13. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. 2008); see also Brief for Petitioner at
1, Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2008).
14. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1241.
15. Id. at 1244.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1248.
18. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6.
19. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 7.
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Montejo “accepted” this appointment of counsel—the facts suggest
that Montejo did not say anything during this hearing.20
After the hearing, Montejo was brought back to the Sheriff’s
Office and asked by Detective Hall what he had done with the
21
murder weapon. Detective Hall was not aware that the Office of the
Indigent Defenders had been appointed to represent Montejo earlier
22
that morning. After being re-Mirandized, Montejo agreed to
accompany detectives in their search for the murder weapon and
other evidence.23 The police, however, never found the murder
24
weapon despite Montejo’s assistance.
While sitting in the back of the police car on the trip to look for
the weapon, Montejo wrote an apology letter to the victim’s widow in
which he asked for forgiveness and explained that he intended only to
commit a burglary, that he had a gun merely to frighten victims, but
that he shot her husband only when he was unable either to frighten
25
him or to escape without violence.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The disposition of Montejo v. Louisiana hinges on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Michigan v. Jackson.26 In Jackson, Bladel was
27
charged with murdering three railroad employees. At his
arraignment, Bladel requested that counsel be appointed for him
because he was indigent.28 A notice of appointment was mailed to a
local law firm, but the firm did not receive it until four days after
29
Bladel’s arraignment. The day before the law firm received the
letter, two detectives approached Bladel, advised him of his Miranda
30
rights, and obtained a confession. Bladel inquired about his
representation following the arraignment, but was not told that a law
firm had been appointed to represent him.31

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1260.
Id. at 1249; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 7.
Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1249.
Id.
Id. at 1249 n.44.
Id. at 1250.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court in Jackson reiterated that “[t]he arraignment signals
the ‘initiation of adversary judicial proceedings’ and thus the
attachment of the Sixth Amendment.”32 The Court held that the
detectives’ conduct, in approaching and then interrogating the
defendant after his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached,
was unconstitutional.33 Although the Court did not mention that a
defendant must accept the right to counsel at the arraignment hearing
34
in order to obtain Sixth Amendment protection, the Court noted in a
footnote that “[t]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request
35
by the defendant.”
In other cases the Court has briefly mentioned the idea of having
to request counsel, but these cases do not resolve the issue of whether
an affirmative request is required. In Michigan v. Harvey, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, stated that
“once a defendant obtains or even requests counsel as respondent
36
had here, analysis of the waiver [of counsel] issue changes.” In
addition, the Court in Patterson v. Illinois stated that “as a matter of
some significance . . . petitioner had not retained, or accepted by
appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned
by authorities.”37
The Court’s most recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, did not address the issue of “requesting”
38
or “accepting” counsel. The Court, however, stated:
Jackson saw no need for lengthy disquisitions on the significance
of the initial appearance, but that was because it found the
attachment issue an easy one. . . . [There is] ‘no doubt’ that the
right to counsel attached at the initial appearance, and Jackson
39
said that the opposite result would be ‘untenable.’

IV. HOLDING
Over Montejo’s objection, the trial court admitted Montejo’s
apology letter into evidence during Detective Hall’s direct

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)).
Id. at 636.
Id. at 633 n.6.
Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)).
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990).
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988).
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008).
Id. at 2591 (citations omitted).
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examination.40 On appeal, while reviewing the lower court’s factual
findings, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached at the September 10 hearing
because, the court acknowledged, the hearing transcript “clearly
shows that counsel was appointed.”41 The court found, however, that
Montejo did not make an affirmative response at this hearing, but
42
only “stood mute.” Therefore, according to the court, “although his
right to counsel had attached, he did not assert his right to counsel
such that the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson would
43
invalidate any waiver he would later make.”
After finding that Montejo had not asserted his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the court held that Montejo waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because his decision not to assert it was
44
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court reasoned that even if
Montejo and the police did not know counsel had been appointed,
“the giving of Miranda warnings and his subsequent waiver of those
rights was sufficient to apprise him of his right to have counsel
present at the interrogation and the consequences of a decision to
proceed without the aid of counsel.”45
Again, whether Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment rights is
46
not at issue before the Supreme Court. Rather, because both parties
agree that the police initiated the interrogation, the issue is whether
Montejo should be afforded the prophylactic protections of Jackson—
striking down as unconstitutional the police-initiated interrogation
that occurred after Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached.47

40. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1250 (La. 2008).
41. Id. at 1260.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1261. A criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be waived;
the waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
44. Id. at 1262.
45. Id.
46. Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2008), available at
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf.
47. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 1; Brief for Respondent at 9, Montejo v.
Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2008).
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V. ANALYSIS
In reaching its decision that Montejo had not affirmatively
accepted the counsel that was appointed to him, the Louisiana
48
Supreme Court relied on Montoya v. Collins. In Montoya, the Fifth
Circuit held that the prophylactic rule established in Jackson was
inapplicable because the defendant, Montoya, had not asserted his
right to counsel.49 The Fifth Circuit held that because Montoya
remained silent after being appointed counsel at his arraignment, the
50
police were not barred from initiating interrogation. The court
explained that it would give a broad interpretation to a defendant’s
request for counsel, but that interpretation was “only required when
51
there [wa]s a ‘request’ or an ‘assertion’ in the first place.”
If the Supreme Court upholds the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision, the practical effect of Louisiana v. Montejo will be that
defendants have to “assert” their right to counsel for the prophylactic
rule of Michigan v. Jackson to come into play—even if, at their
arraignment, a magistrate provides them no opportunity to speak,
thereby equating silence with waiver. This puts criminal defendants in
the illogical position of having to affirmatively request counsel after
counsel has already been appointed to them. This could prove to be,
as Montejo described in his brief, a “trap for the unwary.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not address any of the benefits
or burdens that could arise from their decision. The court simply held
that what is required for the prophylactic rule of Jackson to come into
play is an affirmative assertion by the defendant; because Montejo did
not make any type of assertion, the prophylactic rule of Jackson
barring police-initiated interrogation was not applicable in Montejo’s
52
case.
The problem with the court’s opinion is that the court did not
53
consider how its decision would affect the State of Louisiana. How
will the decision affect criminal defendants, police officers, and public
defenders offices? In Louisiana, police officers can now avoid the
prophylactic rule of Jackson when defendants remain silent after
48. Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1261 n.68 (La. 2008).
49. Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1992).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 283.
52. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1261.
53. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 33, (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court’s
approach would generate intractable problems of administration.”).
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being appointed counsel at their arraignments. Must the public
defenders in Louisiana now attend every arraignment or, at the very
least, read every arraignment transcript to see if the criminal
54
defendant did affirmatively accept counsel?
VI. ARGUMENTS
The State of Louisiana asserts that “[t]he attachment of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel should be distinct from the assertion of
such right.”55 The State argues that it is not fair to apply the harsh rule
of Michigan v. Jackson unless an affirmative request for counsel has
been made by the defendant because “[j]ust as [Montejo] is entitled
to be informed of his rights, the police are entitled to be adequately
informed when a suspect desires to assert his right to counsel.”56 This
is a strong, almost intuitive argument, but it is significantly weakened
in Montejo’s case because there was a representative from the
sheriff’s office present at Montejo’s arraignment.57 It is difficult to
believe, therefore, that the Sheriff’s Department was not aware
Montejo had been appointed counsel before taking him on a search
for the murder weapon—especially when a representative from their
department was present at a hearing where Montejo was
unambiguously appointed counsel earlier that morning.58
The State argues that the defendant’s interest in not being
badgered by the police should be balanced against society’s interest in
59
obtaining information regarding a crime. According to the State,
requiring the defendant to affirmatively request counsel would not
prove to be an unworkable standard, and could enhance police
investigations.60
The State argues that because the rule in Jackson, barring policeinitiated interrogation after a criminal defendant has obtained
counsel, is prophylactic and not constitutional, the added protections
afforded criminal defendants should be weighed against the potential

54. Id.
55. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 4.
58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6–7.
59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 13–14.
60. Id. at 17 (“Contrary to Montejo’s assertion, silence of a defendant will not forfeit a
constitutional protection. However, silence should not be equated with an outright bar to all
police interrogation once counsel is appointed.”).
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harm to criminal investigations—investigations that benefit society by
deterring crime.61 Thus, according to the State, the protections in
Jackson do not need to be completely over-hauled, but the Jackson
rule should not be interpreted so broadly as to bar all police initiated
interrogation after the Sixth Amendment attaches at arraignment.
That way criminal defendants would still be afforded the protections
of Jackson after they affirmatively request counsel, but the police
would still be able to initiate interrogations—furthering their
investigations and arguably benefiting society by reducing crime—
until the defendant requests counsel.62
Montejo’s brief focused on three arguments, the first two of which
were substantive and analyzed herein: 1) requiring criminal
defendants to affirmatively request counsel before the protections of
63
64
Michigan v. Jackson apply is illogical, a “trap for the unwary,” and
65
unadministrable; 2) the decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court is
66
contrary to governing precedent; and 3) even if affirmative
acceptance is required under the facts of this case, Montejo
affirmatively accepted the appointment of counsel.67 These three
arguments are also present in briefs submitted to the Court by the
68
and the National
Louisiana Public Defender’s Association
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.69
Montejo’s first argument is perhaps the strongest. At Montejo’s
arraignment he was appointed counsel by the court. Most criminal
defendants would assume that this appointment confers the benefit of

61. Id. at 13–14.
62. Id.
63. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20–23.
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 32–35.
66. Id. at 24–32.
67. Id. at 35–36.
68. See Brief of Amici Curiae The La. Pub. Defenders Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 3,
Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2008) (“Although the proceedings governing
initial appearance and assignment of counsel vary throughout Louisiana’s districts, a common
thread is that many do not seek affirmative acceptance from indigent defendants. For example,
many appoint counsel automatically or through an indigency investigator. An affirmative
acceptance requirement will have the practical effect of denying these indigent defendants
counsel because they were never asked to accept counsel and will not understand the necessity
of this formality.”).
69. See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 9, Montejo, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2008) (“The Louisiana Supreme Court’s
approach is unfair because different jurisdictions follow different policies and practices in the
appointment of counsel, and these policies and practices often determine whether or not a
defendant makes an explicit request for counsel on the record.”).
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consulting with counsel.70 In fact, the most logical action by the
criminal defendant could be to sit in silence for the rest of the hearing
after the court has appointed an attorney.71
The criminal defendant’s presumption that by remaining silent he
has accepted the attorney appointed to him is even stronger if he was
not given a chance to speak at the arraignment. When a criminal
defendant, such as Montejo, is interrogated by the police hours after
being appointed counsel, the criminal defendant could conclude
either that the attorney is not coming or that he is obligated to
participate in the police initiated interrogation. Thus, the court’s
requiring an affirmative response to the appointment, as was the case
with Montejo, is capable of creating a “trap for the unwary.”72
Second, Montejo argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision is contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson
v. Illinois.73 In Patterson the defendant did not request a lawyer and
had not been appointed one. Under those circumstances, the Court
held that the police could initiate interrogation, and that the
defendant had waived his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a
Miranda waiver. The Court, however, noted that the defendant was
not “an accused [who] has [a] lawyer” because once a defendant has a
lawyer “a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving
the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect.” Thus, as
Montejo notes in his brief “Patterson specifically cited Jackson’s
prohibition on police-initiated interrogations as one of the protections
that arises when a defendant ‘has’ a lawyer.”74
VII. DISPOSITION
To predict how the Court may decide Montejo v. Louisiana, it is
helpful to look at the Court’s most recent Sixth Amendment decision
in Rothgery v. Gillespie County.75 There, the Court held that a criminal
defendant’s first appearance in front of a magistrate marks the point
where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.76 The majority
opinion was written by Justice Souter, and joined by seven other

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 20–21.
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24 (quoting id. at 290 n.3 (citations omitted)).
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008).
Id. at 2581.
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justices—only Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.77 Rothgery
indicates that a broad array of Sixth Amendments protections kick in
at the time of appointment of counsel.78
Rothgery does not address whether an affirmative response is
required after the right to counsel attaches,79 but for a defendant in
Montejo’s circumstances, Rothgery does give several hints about how
80
each Justice interprets the jurisprudence of Jackson. The majority
81
favorably cited Jackson numerous times in its opinion, and that there
was no mention in Rothgery of requiring a defendant to “accept” an
appointment of counsel may indicate that the Court will be unwilling
to accept Louisiana’s argument in Montejo.82 There were no
indications in the Court’s Rothgery opinion that it wanted to limit the
scope of Jackson by requiring criminal defendants to affirmatively
accept counsel.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both filed concurring
83
opinions in Rothgery. Chief Justice Roberts’s one paragraph
concurrence, which Justices Scalia and Alito joined, simply stated that
he saw no need to overturn the Jackson decision.84 Justice Alito’s
concurrence, like the majority opinion, did not appear to lend any
85
credence to Louisiana’s argument in Montejo. Justice Alito never
mentioned the criminal defendant’s need to accept appointment of
counsel—even though his concurrence discussed Jackson at length: “I
interpret the Sixth Amendment to require the appointment of counsel
only after the defendant’s prosecution has begun.”86
Because eight Justices are unwilling to overturn the Jackson
decision,87 and because none indicate that they would require
defendants to affirmatively accept appointment of Jackson,88 it seems
likely that the Court will rule in favor of Montejo. The State’s

77. Id. at 2596–2605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2591 (majority opinion) (“Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled
to the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment
proceedings. . . .”) (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 2578–93.
80. See id.(citing to Jackson favorably more than twenty times).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2578.
84. Id. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
85. See id. at 2592–95 (Alito, J. concurring).
86. Id. at 2594.
87. See id. at 2578–93 (majority opinion).
88. See id.
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strongest argument is that society benefits from enhanced police
investigations, and that requiring criminal defendants to affirmatively
accept appointment of counsel is not sufficiently burdensome to
89
justify compromising these investigations. This argument, however,
seems to cut against the spirit of Jackson—affording criminal
defendants greater Sixth Amendment protection once they become
90
an accused.
The whole issue of affirmatively accepting counsel would appear
to be resolved if the magistrate would, at first appearance, simply ask
the defendant if he wants to have counsel appointed—if the
91
defendant says yes, then Jackson becomes applicable. In Montejo’s
situation, however, it seems peculiar, and perhaps a “trap for the
92
unwary,” not to ask Montejo any direct questions, appoint him
counsel while he is present, and then require him at some later date to
affirmatively accept this appointment. Surely the logical conclusion
drawn by Montejo was that by not saying anything when counsel was
appointed, that he accepted this appointment. And perhaps the most
persuasive fact suggesting that Montejo was being represented by
counsel is that when he arrived back to the Sheriff’s Office after his
trip with detectives to look for the murder weapon, Montejo’s public
defender was waiting to speak with him and was upset with the
detectives.93
The Jackson Court went to great lengths to ensure that criminal
94
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are protected. Thus, with such

89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 13–14.
90. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (“[A]fter a formal accusation has
been made—and a person who had previously been just a ‘suspect’ has become an ‘accused’
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment—the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting
information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier
stage of their investigation.”).
91. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21 (“[I]ndigent defendants in Louisiana are
not asked if they want a lawyer—they are told they have a lawyer. So they have no occasion at
the hearing to express their desire for counsel’s assistance. Nor are defendants informed that
they must make an affirmative gesture of acceptance in order to secure the protections of the
Sixth Amendment.”).
92. Id. at 20–21.
93. See id. at 9 (“After Montejo finished the letter to the victim’s spouse, the detectives
ended the car ride. When they returned to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, they found
Montejo’s lawyer waiting for them.”).
94. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (“[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its
purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our
conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is only at that time that the government has
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compelling facts suggesting that Montejo was represented by counsel,
the current Court, which continues to support the Jackson decision, 95
will likely strike down the Louisiana Supreme Court’s affirmative
acceptance requirement because it is an unnecessary formality, a “trap
for the unweary,” for criminal defendants who have already been
appointed a lawyer.

committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
95. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2578–93 (2008) (citing to Jackson
favorably more than twenty times).

